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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
How the Nation's defense requirements are determined, and how the 
resources which have been determined to be requisite to the Nation's 
defense are used or intended to be used, have become matters of serious 
inquiry by the public and the Congress, especially during the past 
several years. The most cogent reason for this increased interest is, 
of course, cost; for while progress in technology has improved military 
material, the costs of developing weapons and equipment and of placing 
them into use have risen tremendously. In an "arms race" atmosphere, as 
the costs of weapons acquisition rise and the need to maintain military 
forces continues, military requirements from national resources increase 
and the Department of Defense budget registers greater demands on the 
country's tax dollars.
The expansion of the military since 1950 and the mounting defense 
budgets have generated increasing concern over how and how well the 
Department of Defense manages its affairs. Academics have been study­
ing military affairs and have applied economics and other innovative 
management techniques to defense problems. These operational research 
techniques as well as other analytical approaches developed by scholars 
for use in defense decision making have had a noteworthy influence on 
management within the Department of Defense.
To a great extent, the managerial changes instituted since 1961 
have stressed improved procedures for determining and handling military 
requirements. Attention has focused on developing the most effective 
ways to determine military needs and the most economical ways to satisfy
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those needs once their validity has been established. Management 
improvement in the Department of Defense has thus emphasized military 
requirements; how they are determined; how they are programmed; and how 
they are budgeted. These concepts have gained wide acceptance, but the 
search for effective and efficient procedures to implement those 
concepts is still underway.
In 1981 the Reagan Administration came into office dedicated to the 
revitalization of American military strength— in the most effective and 
economical manner. With this strong commitment to National Defense, 
President Reagan supported large increases in the Defense budget. At 
the same time, he also placed a high priority on the more effective and 
efficient use of these government resources.
Along with the increased Defense budget, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) must also accept greater responsibility and increase its own 
efforts to make better use of its resources. This is an absolute 
imperative. The Secretary of Defense has emphasized, and plans to 
continue emphasizing to the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the senior leadership in DOD, that if the department does not 
produce some real savings and cost efficiencies itself, it will be 
difficult for it to maintain the national consensus that currently 
supports increased defense strength.
This was the objective that led to an announcement in March 1981 by 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger of significant changes in the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) of the Department of Defense.
He stated that his objective was not only to revitalize American 
military strengths but also to be sure that the revitalization was
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accomplished in the most effective and economical manner.
Secretary Weinberger's announcement was the result of a thirty-day 
assessment that started with the assumption that the planning system in 
use was still meeting its basic objectives but it was not doing so in 
the most effective and economical manner. The focus of this internal 
assessment was to delve into internal process problems quickly, analyze 
their characteristics, array and discuss the key issues, and focus on 
options for improvements that would make the DOD PPBS even better.
This paper analyzes the Defense Department study and Secretary 
Weinberger's decisions to see if his attempt to bring efficiency and 
practical management into the Defense Department has met his objective
of "effective and economical manner," or if this is just another attempt
to gain media attention on a controversial topic.
METHODOLOGY
Major sections of my paper address the questions presented below. 
Specifically,
* What conditions caused the establishment of PPBS within the 
Department of Defense?
* What "is" PPBS and what is it supposed to do?
* Why was a study undertaken in 1981 to restructure PPBS?
* What was the outcome of this study?
I analyzed the 1981 DOD Study by reviewing available documents as 
well as articles written by the authors of the study. I determined the 
reasons for the establishment of PPBS as well as what PPBS was initially 
supposed to do from books and articles written during the 196D's when 
PPBS was initiated.
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CHAPTER II 
PPBS; THE BACKGROUND
In everyday speech, the words "budget" and "budgeting" carry 
largely negative connotations evoking Images of unwelcome financial 
constraints and of dreary numerical tabulations. Yet despite its lack 
of glamour, budgeting is an essential tool for the management of large 
enterprises. It is first and foremost a planning process, through which 
the manager allocates available resources to the working units of his 
organization. Ideally, a budget should convert goals, programs, and 
priorities into monetary terms following rational economic analysis and 
decision on the optimum means of accomplishing an agency's objectives. 
Moreover, budgeting is an important device for the review and control of 
the activities of the component parts of an organization, to the end 
that overall purposes, and not parochial ones, are served. Thus, modern 
public sector budgeting is inextricably linked to the formulation of 
policy and the orderly execution of programs.
In the Federal Government, the use of the budget process as a 
positive instrument for these purposes is of comparatively recent origin 
and is still evolving. Of course, from the early days of the Republic, 
the Congress used its power to appropriate funds as a means for exerting 
control over the activities of the Executive Branch. It did not, 
however, employ the power of the purse to promote executive responsibil­
ity nor the comprehensive review of programs. The lack of systematic 
budgeting as understood today was acceptable during most of the 
nineteenth century when the country's economy was based primarily 
on agriculture, when its foreign interests and commitments were small.
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and when Federal activities were limited in scope and impact. However, 
such haphazard procedures became increasingly inadequate as industrial­
ization and urbanization proceeded and the tasks of government expanded.
During the late 1950s Defense budgeting was criticized with 
increasing frequency within the Executive Branch, by members of the 
Congress, and by private citizens. The lines of dissent and the reasons 
given for them were diverse. Many critics stressed the importance to 
national security of assuring that foreign, economic, and military 
policies were properly coordinated and that imbalances in the force 
structure were eliminated. For example, the Rockefeller report on the 
problems of U. S. Defense recommended in 1958 that a start be made 
toward a budgetary system that corresponds more closely to a coherent 
strategic doctrine. It should not be too difficult to restate the 
presentation of the Service budgets, so that instead of the current 
categories of "procurement," operation and maintenance, military person­
nel, etc., there would be a much better indication of how much goes for 
specific projects.
At the same time, other critics hoped that more meaningful fiscal 
presentations would permit reductions in the Defense budget and more 
rational use of resources.
Whatever the reasons, the calls for budgetary reforms were being 
sounded in growing volume. More than improvements in techniques were 
needed.
President Eisenhower was in agreement. He felt that there were 
better ways to make the budget process a more effective instrument for 
reviewing and integrating programs and performance In the area of
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national security. In his final budget message to the Congress, 
President Eisenhower stated that the budget process is possibly the most 
significant device for planning, controlling, and coordinating our 
programs and policies as well as our finances.
While the specific proposals for change reflected problems current 
at the time, they also constituted the latest stage in the long standing 
effort to adjust government institutions to new roles as conditions 
changed. The post-World War II situation had required the United States 
to take a greatly expanded role in international affairs. The adjust­
ment to this demand was further complicated by the scientific and 
technological revolution that was taking place concurrently. Approached 
from this perspective, the budgetary reforms of 1961 and subsequent 
years were a continuation of the traditional search for better govern­
ment .
The introduction of any major innovation requires not only a 
recognition of the need for change but also the availability of the 
tools for an effective solution. Both were present by 1961. The 
economic theory of price and allocation, a branch of moral philosophy In 
Adam Smith's day, had been reduced to mathematical terms and developed 
Into a usable Instrument for quantitative analysis of problems of 
choice. In the late 1940s the Air Force established Project RAND and 
Mr. Charles J. Hitch began to assemble the Economics Division of the 
RAND Corporation. During the 1950s this group began applying economic 
analysis to the selection of weapons systems and strategies, as a 
research tool, to the point that, by 1961, it was ready for use as a 
management technique in the Defense Department. The 1940s and 1950s
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also saw the rapid development of many other tools of analysis that 
might be grouped under the general title of "decision theory." The list 
includes statistical decision theory, theory of games, and linear pro­
gramming. Operations research, a new discipline in World War II, was 
expanding constantly beyond the solution of tactical problems and the 
analysis of single weapons to broader fields, particularly under the 
influence of economists, who contributed their deceptively simple 
technique of isolating a problem, arraying alternatives, estimating the 
utilities and cost of each, and choosing the alternative that yields the 
greatest excess of utilities over costs. The digital computer, a 
classified project during World War II, had achieved capabilities to 
store and display vast amounts of information and to do computations of 
a scale undreamed of only a few years earlier.
Thus, by 1961 there was a general recognition of the need for 
change. With the arrival of the Kennedy Administration came new 
thoughts on defense policy and new approaches to defense management.
The ensuing years saw a considerably improved balance in the Nation’s 
total military posture, with broadened capabilities for all 
contingencies— from "peacekeeping" missions to limited or general war, 
either nuclear or nonnuclear. Of necessity, the achievement of this 
objective entailed a higher level of defense spending, but this was not 
an invitation for reckless spending.
Herein lay an opportunity to design new ways of looking at our 
force structures and weapon systems; balancing increases in the power 
and versatility of strategic forces with the expansion of conventional 
forces; and reducing, postponing, or eliminating programs of marginal or
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dubious effectiveness. The new Pentagon team, led by Robert S.
McNamara, was quick to avail itself of this opportunity.
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy 
Administration, was not very well known. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate from 
the University of California, he also attended Harvard Business School. 
After a short stay with the accounting firm of Price, Waterhouse & 
Company, he returned to Harvard as an Assistant Professor of Business 
Administration. During World War II McNamara served in the Army Air 
Force statistical control program; and after the war he and nine associ­
ates moved to the Ford Motor Company. McNamara moved up rapidly, and by 
age 44, he had risen to the presidency of the company the day after 
Kennedy's election.
McNamara first declined the position of Secretary of Defense and 
then allowed himself to be persuaded by the arguments of the President­
elect and the promise that he would have a free hand in personnel and 
organization. In January 1961 he moved into the Secretary's office and 
proceeded to revolutionize the job.
McNamara became Secretary of Defense at a time when there were 
serious doubts as to the adequacy of the Nation's defenses. On the one 
hand was the fear that the United States could not respond to hostile 
military action with anything less than resort to all-out nuclear 
warfare, a fear reinforced by evident weaknesses in conventional forces 
and reports of a dangerous "missile gap." On the other hand, the size 
of the military establishment and its budget, and the effect of defense 
decisions on almost every aspect of American life had aroused not only 
apprehensions over the "military-industrial complex" of which President
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Elsenhower had warned, but also recurring doubts over the manageability 
of the military and the concept of civilian control.
McNamara, like Kennedy, thus took office at a time of national 
uneasiness, when there was a real need for purposeful, energetic leader­
ship In the Department of Defense as in the Nation. Within a short time 
after he became Secretary of Defense, McNamara made It clear that he had 
brought this kind of leadership to the department and that his methods 
and philosophy would earn him both ardent praise and fierce criticism.
McNamara's basic directive from the President called for him to 
evaluate national defense policy and the adequacy of the means available 
to support It, to suggest whatever changes in policy, organization, or 
procedures he though necessary or desirable, and to procure and maintain 
as economically as possible whatever military resources were needed. 
These tasks McNamara undertook immediately and vigorously, practically 
turning the Pentagon upside down. His vigorous attack on the problems 
before him clearly indicated that he intended to be an active and 
aggressive manager of the defense establishment.
McNamara acquired an awesome reputation for his capacity to assimi­
late data and to translate It into programs. He established new 
agencies, encouraged re-organlzatlons of the military departments, and 
moved functions from the departments to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. He radically altered the budget process, created new commands 
and abolished boards and committees. The results were an unquestioned 
strengthening of civilian control, the systematizing of decision-making, 
and Improvements in American nuclear and conventional capabilities.
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The McNamara changes can be loosely grouped Into three principal 
areas but this paper is only concerned with two. The first was the 
development of a system to provide the Secretary with the information he 
needs. This included the construction of a planning-programnlng-budgeting 
system tying together in terms of national objectives, the estimates, 
requirements, expenditures, and projected activities of all military 
agencies and commands.
McNamara made extensive use of a previously unpublicized decision­
making tool known as system analysis. This procedure stresses 
quantitative analysis as a means of reinforcing value judgements, and 
it uses analytical tools to provide policy makers with a clear picture 
of goals and alternatives.
The second major change instituted by Secretary McNamara was the 
emphasis given to finding more economical ways of accomplishing defense 
objectives. The highly publicized cost reduction program was designed 
to eliminate waste, unnecessary duplication, and "gold plating," while 
other efforts were undertaken to develop more economical and effective 
procurement procedures.
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PPBS PROBLEM AREAS
The introduction of PPBS by Secretary McNamara into the Defense 
Department greatly improved the quality of the budgetary process with 
DOD. PPBS as designed by McNamara, however, was by no means perfect
nor was it implemented without criticism.
The entire process was overcentralized. Too many decisions were
left to the Secretary. By his own admission, McNamara made some 700
budget decisions annually. Moreover, the subunits of DOD and agencies 
outside of the Pentagon were virtually excluded from the process. The 
military services and the JCS could only comment on or attempt to change 
the initiatives of the Secretary. Secretary McNamara and his staff did 
the real planning and programming, and in their review of the service 
budget submissions, they penetrated to the depths of the individual 
budgets. No item was too small to escape their scrutiny. Similarly, 
the agencies outside the Pentagon had almost no imput into or impact 
upon the defense budget. The NSC offered no guidance for formulating 
the budget, the Bureau of the Budget could not set a ceiling on or 
change the defense budget, and there was no mechanism to review it for 
conformity with national policy.
Secretary McNamara downgraded the value of military expertise and 
past budgeting experience. This was a mistake because systems analysis 
is more of an art than a science. There is a great deal of reliance 
upon judgment and intuition. Frequently, the objectives are either un­
known or subject to change. For many of the crucial variables there was 
no mathematical function that would express the desired relationship. 
Finally, there may be no single criterion for judging results among
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conflicting objectives. Therefore, the military professionals, by 
virtue of their experience, could have brought many insights into the 
analytical process by which Secretary McNamara constructed the budget. 
This procedure virtually made it impossible for the professional 
military officers to make any meaningful contributions.
Several aspects of PPBS frequently collapsed under the pressure of 
time constraints that are Inherent in the budgetary cycle. Rarely, if 
ever, were all the programming decisions completed before the budgetary 
cycle commenced. In fact, on several occasions, the program decisions 
were made after the budgets were finished. If the budgets are not 
developed from the programs, much of the rationale for PPBS is gone.
The failure to provide specific fiscal guidance early in the budget 
process made it necessary to reduce the budget requests by large amounts 
in a very short period of time. This process was so hectic that it 
often led to hasty and ill-conceived decisions. These problems will now 
be addressed.
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CHAPTER I I I
A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE DECISIONS
Whether rightly or wrongly called a system, PPBS apparently began
as DOD'8 response to a Congressional request. Representative George
Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, had, in two
letters written to the Secretary of Defense In 1959-1960, requested that
DOD provide budget information that could be related to major military
missions of the Armed Forces in terms of the programs and the costs that
supported individual missions.^
During USAF "Project Rand," Charles J. Hitch had developed such a
perspective of military budgeting and had expressed this in a book he
2co-authored with Roland McKean. Some ten months later, at McNamara's 
request. Hitch was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) and began the introduction of the new function, 
programming, to bridge the gap between the already existing military
3planning function and the budgeting function in DOD.
At that time, 1961, the budget structure of the military 
establishment was organized by resource categories, i.e., costs for 
military personnel, procurement, military construction, operation and
Harry R. Page, "The Integration and Systematization of Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting," in Federal Contribution to Management, David 
Brown, ed. (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1971), p. 154.
2Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense 
in the Nuclear Age. (New York: Antheneum, 1966).
3
Charles J. Hitch, "Decision Making for Defense," H. Rowan
Gaither Lectures in Systems Science (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1965), p. 27-30.
13
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maintenance, research and development, and inputs from the Services. 
However, the planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the separate 
Services was expressed in terms of combinations of weapons systems and 
various military units or forces— the "outputs" of the military system. 
It was difficult, if not impractical, to attempt correlation of budgeted 
inputs with the planned outputs, as the budget resources were grouped by 
individual services and were applicable for only one year. In 
contrast, the military forces and weapon systems assigned to the 
various mission combinations were multi-service in operation and were 
projected by planning over intervals of many years. Unification of the 
Armed Forces had proceeded well enough in organization and mission 
assignment but not in budgeting. Some missions were a predominant 
responsibility of one service and could, by extensive research, be 
connected with part of the resources allocated to that service.
However, this was not done, nor were the military units or weapons 
systems assigned to a particular task or mission compared in terms of 
that mission's effectiveness. Hence, the efficiency of the different 
units or weapons systems, in terms of an input-output ration, was a 
matter of opinion or conjecture. Nevertheless, decisions on allocation 
of resources to the Armed Forces or their respective weapons systems had 
to be made. Since even if efficiency in translation from input to 
output was not discernible, the resources that would be requested from, 
and perhaps appropriated by, the Congress were limited, and it was 
necessary to equate the mission of the Armed Forces with ability to 
support them. Hitch's dual purpose in introducing PPBS into DOD was:
(1) to produce an annual budget in a form acceptable to Congress; and
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(2) to provide managers at all levels in the military establishment with 
the information they needed for effective and economical performance.^ 
The planning, programming, and budgeting system he developed with 
Secretary McNamara's approval was a three-phase process that met this 
dual purpose. Later in 1965, at President Johnson's request, PPBS was 
adopted by other departments of the federal government,̂  although the 
planning processes and the analytic methods developed and employed were 
in many cases different from those of DOD.^ As noted by Hitch in his 
final lecture, "Retrospect and Prospect," of the H. Rowan Gaither 
series:
The programming system facilitates the systematic 
use of quantitative analysis comparing the costs 
and effectiveness of alternative programs. But 
programming is possible, and has been used with­
out systems analysis and can achieve some of its 
important objectives— order— consistency and^rough 
intuitive balance among programs without it.
The above quotation explains the variations in subsequent 
employment of PPRS in government and subsequently in industry.
As introduced in DOD to assist in management decisions, however, 
PPBS was based upon systems analysis to determine the effectiveness
*Ibid., p. 28.
^K. L. Weidenbaum, "Program Budgeting and the Space Program," in 
Systems, Organizations, Analysis, Management, Cleland and King, eds., p. 
185.
^Robert A. Levine, "Systems Analysis in the War on Poverty," 
Systems, Organizations, Analysis, Management, Cleland and King, eds., p. 
235.
^Hitch, "Decision Making for Defense," p. 53.
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of alternative ways of accomplishing a purpose and upon cost benefit 
analysis as a measure of efficiency and economy. Programming, the novel 
feature of the PPBS, was to be used as a bridge between planning and 
budgeting.
The natures of systems analysis and programming are distinct. The
analytic procedures are of assistance to judgment in the management
process of deciding upon weapons systems. The programming process
complements the planning process by relating and allocating resources to
purposes and objectives and coordinates the long-range planning process
8with the short-range control process of budgeting.
"Programming" is recognized as the process of scheduling the 
acquisition and allocation of resources required to support the planned 
steps leading to objectives or to carry out planned missions. As 
initially conceived in DOD, planning-programming was to be concurrently 
continued throughout the year and projected forward over a multi-year 
period. Hitch, as DOD Comptroller, first set this time period at five
9years, or the life of an individual program package if shorter.
The program package was defined as an inter-related group of 
program elements which complemented one another or were close 
substitutes for each other. The DOD program elements were combinations 
of men, equipment, and installations such as aircraft wings, infantry 
battalions, combatant ships, etc., together with the supporting units
g
D. J. Smalter, "The Influence of Defense Practices on Corporate 
Planning," in Systems, Organizations, Analysis, Management. Cleland and 
King, eds., p. 2.
9
Hitch, "Decision Making for Defense," p. 53.
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required to make in combination an effective military force that could 
be related to a specific national security o b j e c t i v e . F o r  example, 
one program package vas the Strategic Warfare Forces, which had the 
mission of fighting an all-out nuclear war, composed of the program 
elements: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and Air Force
bombing s q u a d r o n s . T h e  weapons systems which formed these various 
elements come from all three Services, unified by a common mission or 
set of purposes.
The terminology explaining the program structure has changed 
somewhat in the Department of Defense. An observer will now find
references to "programs" to facilitate review and analysis along service
12lines. However, the term "program element" remains in use and is 
the primary means of identifying in detail the combination of resources 
as planned requirements, program packages, or budget activities.
The initial program structure of eight program packages assembled in
1961 by the Office of Programming in the Office of the Secretary of
13Defense followed the suggestions of Congressman Mahon. However, it 
was expected that the program structure would be modified, and 
modification of the structure to ten programs occurred in 1967. 
Thereafter, the Five Tear Defense Program (FTDP) contained ten programs
^^Page, "The Integration and Systematization of PPB," p. 158.
^4bid., p. 159.
12Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller, Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting: A Systems Approach to Management, 2d ed. (Chicago: Markham,
1969), p. 409.
13Page, "The Integration and Systematization of PPB," p. 156.
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composed of program elements associated with a particular system or 
function, related to a program/budget activity of a particular armed 
service by a six-digit identifying number. The DOD program element is 
usually a grouping of units, manpower, and costs associated with an 
organization, a group of similar organizations, a function or a project, 
although costs as the common denominator of all resources may be the 
only measure of value presented.
The program elements are often described as the program building 
blocks and as such may be aggregated in various ways to present the 
particular situation that is being investigated. They may be aggregated 
to display the total resources assigned to a specific program; they may 
be aggregated to weapons and support systems in a program; or they nay 
be aggregated to Identify particular resources such as operating costs. 
They may be aggregated differently for either programming or management 
purposes and perhaps in another way for budget reviews.
The program package concept becaaie the framework for translating 
mission plans into program objectives on a time interval schedule. This 
translation required that the planning process and the programming 
process be adaptable to and coordinated with each other.
Hitch initially considered recasting both the existing planning and 
budgeting processes of DOD into program categories and terms and had 
tentatively prepared a budget model for this purpose. However, the
14U.S. Navy Logistics Management School, General Dynamics, Fiscal 
and Life Cycles of Defense Systems, 3d ed. (Pomona, Ca.; U. S. Navy 
Logistics Management School, 1976), p. 37.
l^Ibid., p. 37.
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managerial requirements of DOD and the appropriate procedures of the 
Bureau of the Budget and the Congress led him to believe that retention
' C
of the existing budget structure was desirable. Planning, though, 
was later adapted to the programming system.
Both planning and programming were to be continuous processes not 
constrained by the annual budget cycle, though linked to that cycle 
through the policies and procedures established by the Secretary of 
Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Congress. Programs were to 
be formulated by the Services in support of the military requirements 
generated by the mission planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As 
strategies, and therefore missions, could change, and new requirements 
for forces or weapons might be needed to better carry out existing 
missions, a system for updating and revising the programs was provided. 
Originally known as the Program Change Proposal System and later in 1967 
as Program Change Requests, the system provided policies and procedures 
for determining why, when, and how changes were to be proposed, and the
procedure for Incorporating approved changes into an existing
17program.
Over the years, because of the impact of changes in DOD management 
and requirements of the Office of Management and Budget or Congressional 
review, the organization and procedures of PPBS developed and changed. 
However, the original purpose of relating and allocating the inputs of 
resources available to military objectives through joint planning.
^^Hitch, "Decision Making for Defense," p. 30.
^^Page, "The Integration and Systematization of PPB," p. 163.
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coordinated analysis and centralized decision making remained intact. A 
comprehensive description of the ?PB system by which DOD used to 
accomplish that purpose appears in a General Dynamics Corporation study 
of Defense Systems. This study describes PPBS as the development of;
A THREAT— into— STRATEGY— into— NEEDS— into— PROGRAMS— into—
BUDGET OBJECTIVE.*®
Implicit in this process are the development of mid-range objectives, 
the conduct of special studies, and development of weapons systems and 
their support.
The PPB process now occurs over a one-and-one-half cycle of the
following basic steps which are scheduled each year by the Secretary of 
19Defense.
1. JCS submit their strategy to the Secretary of Defense.
2. Secretary of Defense issues strategic guidance.
3. Secretary of Defense issues tentative five-year fiscal guidance
to the DOD Components for comment.
4. JCS submit their forces plan to the Secretary of Defense based 
on the strategic guidance. This plan is not fiscally constrained but 
presents what is needed and what can be attained.
5. Secretary of Defense issues fiscal guidance to the DOD
Components by major force and support categories for each of the program 
years.
18General Dynamics Fiscal and Life Cycles of Defense Systems, p.
12 .
^*Ibid., p. 13.
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6. JCS submit joint force recommendations, rationale, and risk 
assessments, fiscally constrained consistent with the Secretary of 
Defense's fiscal guidance.
7. DOD Components submit their program objectives including forces 
and support, with rational and risk assessment. These are also fiscally 
constrained with Secretary of Defense fiscal guidance.
8. Secretary of Defense issues final program decisions after draft 
decisions have been commented on by the DOD Components.
9. DOD Components submit their budget estimates for the fiscal
year.
The process cycle consists of three phases:
1. Planning; the first phase of PPBS, starts with an assessment of
the world situation at prescribed future time periods, proceeds to the
military strategy and the technical capabilities required to counter
threats to national security or interests, and culminates with the
projection of force objectives to satisfy the national strategy. This
projection of force objectives Is limited to the capabilities of actual
forces and the capabilities of research and production to obtain forces 
20in the future.
2. Programming then translates the approved mission concepts and 
objectives of the planning phase into a definite structure expressed In 
terms of time-phased resource requirements Including men, money, and 
material. This is accomplished through systematic approval procedures 
that cost-out force objectives for financial and manpower resources five
^^Ibld., pp. 14-15.
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years into the future, while at the game time displaying force
2’objectives for an additional three years. * Thus, the impact of 
present day decisions upon future military posture is evident to the 
reviewers and decision makers of DOD and subsequently the President and 
Congress. The analysis and comparisons of alternative ways of achieving 
force objectives which had taken place in the coordinated planning of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and DOD military departments and agencies 
extended into analysis for program decisions on the optimum ways of 
scheduling and employing the resources required. These program
decisions are, in effect, budget decisions and lead to the third phase
22of the cycle.
3. Budgeting, the final phase of the PPBS cycle, is the process of 
consolidating program priority requirements into the next annual funding 
requests to be submitted by DOD to the Congress via the Office of 
Management and Budget (0MB). The proposed budget is based on budget 
policies established by the President and 0KB, and is constrained by the 
schedules for acquisition or phase-out of resources determined and 
approved in the programming phase. As in step 7 in the one-and-one-half 
year cycle of PPBS, above, the DOD Components submit their next annual 
budget estimates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for analysis. 
Following this analysis, a series of hearings attended by the Secretary 
of Defense, the various heads of the DOD Components and, at times 
representatives of 0MB, are held to resolve any problem areas in the
2^Ibid, p. 16. 
^^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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esticates submitted. The Secretary of Defense Program Budgeting
Decisions (FED) that result from the analysis and hearings are related to
the DOD budget structure of the ensuing budget year and of appropriate
prior years. Included in the decision record of the FED is the
estimated impact of the FED on the next program year. "Réclamas" or
requests for revision of the Secretary of Defense decisions may then be
submitted by dissatisfied DOD Components and are discussed in joint
meetings of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
heads of DOD Components. The final decisions of the Secretary of
Defense are then incorporated in the proposed DOD Budget submitted to
230MB, thus completing the budgeting phase of the FFE cycle.
The PPBS process just described is unique to DOD. It is the formal
systematic method that evolved from the basic programming process
24inaugurated in 1961. The evolution to the present resulted not only 
from the desire for improvement with DOD, but from other influences, 
such as the extension of FFES to all federal departments by Presidential 
imposition in 1965, and the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense 
Panel in 1970. In presenting the Fiscal Year 1977 Budget to the Armed 
Services Committee of Senate, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, 
said;
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) continues as the framework for the planning 
and execution of the Defense program. The PPBS was 
designed in 1961 as a single coherent management
^^Ibid., pp. 18-19.
24William A. Niskanan, The Defense Resource Allocation Process in 
Defense Management, p. 15.
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system to provide information on missions, force 
levels and weapon systems. At that time, all 
Department of Defense Resources were segregated into 
major mission and support categories which became 
the ten "programs" of the Five Year Defense Program 
(FYDP) and their program elements became the 
"building blocks" for decision making and resource 
allocation....25
25U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal 
Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and 
Development and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths. S. Hearings Rept., 94th Cong., 2d seas., 1976, S. 2965, Part 
I, Authorizations, p. 315.
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CHAPTER ;V 
THE STUDY
By 1981, the existing PPBS had grown top heavy and congested with
paperwork, and detail. Planning did not "consider" fiscal realities, and
a proliferation of structures and data bases were working against smooth
flow of the PPBS cycle. While the system was still meeting its basic
objectives, it certainly was not doing so in the most effective and
26economical manner. Considering all this, it was no surprise to
professional DOD resource managers when shortly after taking office,
Frank Carlucci, the incoming Deputy Secretary of Defense, mandated a
"quick review of the planning, programming and budgeting process" noting
that the system that existed within DOD did not meet the needs of top
27level defense managers. To accomplish this review and develop 
recommendations for an improved PPBS process, a Steering Group was 
formed with representatives from the OSD staff agencies, the Joint 
Staff, and each Military Department and Service. All members of this 
group had wide previous experience as well as current responsibilities 
for managing PPBS within DOD.
The review was organized to provide maximum participation by every 
major OSD staff agency and each of the services to assure that all 
points of view would be expressed, both in the analysis and in the 
decision phase of the review.
26Casper W. Weinberger, "SECDEF Weinberger’s Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System Brings Practical Management to the
Defense Program" Program Manager, Vol. X (May-June 1981): 14.
27Richard J . Kallion, George L. Moses, and Mary K. Smith, 
"Refocusing the PPBS," Resource Management Journal, (Fall 1981): 14.
25
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Problems Vith the Existing PPBS
The DOD PPBS process has the objective of preparing and executing a 
budget that is larger and more complex than any other governmental 
agency. The quick, thirty day assessment undertaken in 1981 was not 
designed to analyze in depth how well this objective was being met. The 
existing process was accepted as basically meeting that objective. The 
focus of the review effort was, instead, to delve into internal process 
problems quickly, and analyze their characteristics, array and discuss
the key issues, and focus on options for improvements that would make
28PPBS within DOD even better.
It became increasingly clear as the review progressed that the 
accretion over the years of differing objectives and management styles 
calling, first, for programming emphasis, then participatory management, 
and recently zero based budgeting, with major characteristics of each 
imbedded simultaneously in the PPBS, had created serious system wide 
problems.
The McNamara PPB system created the Five Year Defense Program 
(FYDP) and interposed OSD programming direction and primacy between JCS 
planning and service budgeting. It was developed in response to a 
management style and a set of circumstances which have changed markedly 
over the intervening years. Programming (the structuring of resources 
by mission) was a new concept in 1960. The military services have since 
incorporated programming into their own budget preparation. They have 
created extensive programming organizations with well-trained and
28Vincent Puritano, "Streamlining PPBS," Defense 81, (August
1981): 22.
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experienced staffs to respond to the widespread program interests in 
such areas as in Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Logistics, Research and 
Engineering, Program Analysis, and Evaluation.
The Laird management style and resulting process of participatory 
management was subsequently overlaid on the McNamara PPBS. Under 
Secretary Laird, more programming initiative was given to the services 
but, simultaneously, there were initiatives in the opposite direction to 
centralize the process for acquisition. Later, the Carter administra­
tion's Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) system, which emphasized annual total 
review rather than stable multi-year planning and called for analyes at 
three fiscal levels, was added to— rather than Integrated with— the DOD 
PPB system. This combination of three disparate systems had heavily 
over- burdened DOD staffs and aggravated the confusion of the role of 
staff and line functions within OSD. The separation of JCS planning 
from the service budget process caused by the imposition of OSD 
programming was an additional problem that had not been adequately 
addressed.
There were two major problems in the programming and budgeting 
phases of the PPBS. One was the residual confusion of roles of the line 
and staff functions in OSD, and the other was the failure of ZBB to aid
the Secretary in the management of the department, while adding to the
29data and paperwork load.
The confusion of line and staff roles was a residual of Secretary 
McNamara's reliance upon OSD staff to initiate as well as review
29 Ibid., p. 22,
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programs. Although Secretary Laird placed program Initiation with the 
services, there were a number of subsequent countervailing influences 
which favored centralization. These influences included: the failure
to create a credible planning system; the greatly Increased demands from 
Congress which had created its own budget process competing with the 
Executive Branch and also greatly expanded its staff; and the emergence 
of cross-service planning for major programs. These trends encouraged 
continuation of OSD directive programmic guidance to the services, 
generating additional paperwork and creating strong adversarial 
relationships between OSD and the services.
The second major programming problem was the failure of zero based 
budgeting. The theory of ZBB is adequate for small organizations with
consistent goals. However, it is not designed for large multi-level
31hierarchies where sub-units may have competitive goals.  ̂ The sheer 
size of DOD forced the "rationing" of decision packages to field 
organizations. The competitive nature of the budget process also forced 
"gold watches" (high priority programs) into the margin. In addition, 
the ZBB features of multiple budget levels, narratives, and 
prioritization created large volumes of paperwork which proved
essentially useless since neither the Secretary nor 0KB felt that the
32resulting displays were useful for decision making. One service
30^^Ibid., p. 23. 
^hbid., p. 23.
^^Welnberger, "SECDEF Weinberger's Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System Brings Practical Management to the Defense Program," p. 
14.
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estimated that traditional budgeting required the preparation of 350
reports. ZBB added approximately 800 additional reports in the formal
Decision Unit Overviews and Decision Package Sets which did not replace
33the traditional budget reports. The system had not proven useful in 
presentations to higher levels of decision makers. The ZBB concept 
simply had not worked.
The succession of systems also greatly expanded the data structure 
so that the FYDP was no longer the common, basic data base of PPBS. A 
variety of competing formats, structures, and data banks evolved. This 
shifting of classification of defense activities and the expanding 
efforts necessary to respond to and maintain the various data banks led 
to duplication of data requests, displays, and paperwork as well as 
worker overload.
Problems in the Planning Phase 
The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), the most complete 
force planning document in the DOD PPB system, was not limited by a
maximum dollar amount. It usually contained higher force levels than
could be accommodated within the fiscal guidance. While useful in 
assuring that arbitrary resource constraints do not dictate our overall 
military strategy, it resulted in force planning that failed to consider 
resource constraints. In these circumstances, it became irrelevant or 
useless during the programming and budgeting phases.
Recognizing this problem, the JCS provided "Risk Reduction
33Puritano, "Streamlining PPBS," p. 23. 
^^Ibid., p. 24.
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Measures" (RRM) in the last three annual planning documents. These 
measures recognized that the unconstrained planning force was not likely 
to be affordable within the mid-range (3-10 years ahead) period; they 
thus attempted to identify the most critical areas of risk.
In fact, however, even the JSPD risk reduction measures were of 
limited value. Their programmatic focus and structure (a brief 
description plus funding profile) tended to reflect the current 
programmatic emphasis, as opposed to planning emphasis, and provided 
poor linkage to the planning objectives, strategies and problems with 
which the measures sought to deal. Also, their content suggested 
apportionment of risk by service dollars, rather than as assessment of 
total risk by functional warfare or contingency areas.
The sizing, structuring, and assessment of the total force could 
not be effectively accomplished without unambiguous, but broad, guidance 
on the peacetime/crisis/wartime priorities to be accorded the various 
missions and theater contingencies. Planning guidance (i.e., criteria 
and assumptions on which force size and structure are based) should be 
Issued before force building or assessment can begin. This was done, 
however, on an informal basis for each item of approved guidance.
Although there was a sequence of planning development from JCS and 
the services to the Secretary of Defense culminating in the Defense 
Policy Guidance (DPG), there was no high-level dialogue in the process. 
The JCS (and other DOD policy bodies) generally were forced to rely on 
"literature searches" of SECDEF speeches. Congressional testimony. 
Presidential statements, and National Security Council (NSC) and State
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Department memoranda directives, and policy statements to derive and 
develop implicit national and defense policy.
There was only sporadic articulation of short-term deficiencies 
bearing on theater contingencies and other missions. There was also a 
tendency to overestimate the potential success and stability of current 
programs together with the effectiveness of new systems being produced. 
At the same time, there was Inadequate long-term vision and 
differentiation between solving short-term problems and dealing with 
longer-term obligations. There was also no connection between near-term 
contingency employment concepts based on current force capabilities 
implied in the constrained force. There were no steps in the later 
phases of the PPBS that dealt with these fundamental discrepancies.^^
In addition there was a mismatch not only between stated U.S. 
policies and the current capabilities of the forces to implement these 
policies, but also between policies and planned longer-term 
capabilities. In effect, DOD had traded near-term readiness for 
long-term Investment within the relatively constrained Defense budget 
projections. The problems are that tomorrow's objectives expand rather 
than contract, threats outpace our efforts to deal with them, and the 
FYDP never delivers as it promises.
Problems in the Programming Phase 
The Study Group generally agreed that there was an over-abundance 
of program direction in the Consolidated Guidance and an inordinate
^^Ibid., p. 24. 
^^Ibid., p. 24.
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amount of detail data being requested in the program preparation
37instructions. This detailed guidance resulted in military department 
documents that were so large as to be undigestible by any one individual. 
In turn, these proposals, when compared to the specific guidance, give 
rise to a large number of issues, all of which were addressed by the 
Defense Resources Board. Also contributing to the larger number of 
issues was the fact that DOD fiscal projections were not sufficient to 
fund all the objectives stated in the program guidance.
Although the DRB is the SECDEF's corporate review board, it did not 
include as a permanent or associate member any service representation, 
although the services provided observers on call. The multitude of 
program issues, ZBB requirements, and the resultant work demands on the 
services and the OSD staff had the effect of focusing most of the review 
effort on the upcoming budget review rather than on the full five-year
program. Top DOD officials complained that they could do little or no
38realistic thinking about out-year issues and their Implications.
In addition, in the middle of the program cycle, the Joint Program 
Assessment Memorandum (JPAK), an assessment of the military risk 
involved with the service programs, was issued by the JCS after their 
review of the service Program Operating Memoranda. Because of the 
timing of the JPAK and the tendency of the JCS not to play an active 
part in the programming cycle, JCS views often were not incorporated in 
the issue papers.
^^Ibid., p. 24. 
^®Ibid., p. 25.
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Program instability reflected some apparent shortcomings in the 
current programming procedures. For example, there were 160 Priority
Change Proposals (PCP's) in the last budget phase for programs that had
39been "decided" in the programming phase. In the Navy Shipbuilding
Program, an area which by its nature should be long-term and stable,
major initiatives were alternately inserted and dropped out as the cycle
progressed. Because of the number of months the process took to come to
a decision, all of the efforts by the many technical and contract
offices were done and redone, and tough decisions were put on hold until
the final days of the cycle.
Another symptom of overcontrol is the abundance of "major" issues.
Issue papers are developed by OSD staff in at least seven areas:
Strategic Forces; Theater Nuclear Forces; General Purpose Forces;
Communication, Command, and Control; RDT&E; Manpower and Logistics; and
Intelligence. In the past PPB cycle, 150 issues were generated and 375
"thumbnail sketches" (one-page issue papers) were submitted by OSD,
Office of Management and Budget (0MB), and the Arms Control and
40Disarmament Agency to the DRB. Each of these papers contained a 
staff alternative to a service program and all had to be reviewed and 
discussed by various staffs during the programming cycle.
Problems in the Budgeting Phase 
The end result of over one year of DOD planning, programming, and 
preparation of budget estimates was the presentation each year of the
^^Ibid., p. 25. 
*°Ibld., p. 25.
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President's budget to the Congress. Immediately preceding this present­
ation, in late December, DOD experienced a phenomenon referred to as 
"tail end perturbations." Sudden late changes to the budget estimates 
and supporting programs were brought on by late 0MB and presidential
decisions on fiscal levels, programs, and/or a revised inflation 
41forecast. These new data had to be quickly incorporated into a 
myriad of documents without disturbing balances painstakingly developed 
over a course of several months. The result was often a crash series of 
meetings culminating in conflicting guidance and unbalanced resource 
allocation for some program areas. Aside from the fact that the timing, 
management, and impact of this annual phenomenon tended to reduce 
confidence in the integrity of the system, there was a persistent 
"ripple effect" on program justification to Congress, re-orientatlon of 
policy, and implementation of budget decisions.
Excessive paperwork in the budget phase also reached the point of
42nearly breaking down the whole system. This has occurred in the 
last four years as ZBB procedures quadrupled the numbers of exhibits, 
listings, displays, and formats of data presentation. As a result,
OSD, service, and OJCS staffs all complained of the inability to provide 
quality work in a timely manner.
Another major problem in budgeting has been the inability of the 
system to produce a consistent set of categories to describe the 
activities within the budget from early planning through to the
^4bid., p. 26.
^^Ibid., p. 26
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4 3Congressional submissions. As a result, much time is spent in 
translation routines during which inconsistencies, or apparent 
inconsistencies, are created. When the later occurs, justification of 
the Congressional categories is sometimes allowed to drive programmatic 
decisions.
The need to explain costs in appropriation categories led to the 
creation of large "budget back-up" or budget justification books which
took information from program formats and transcribed it into other
44displays. Contradictions or perceived discrepancies between the
various displays also generated significant workload in preparation of 
explanations.
System-Wide Problems 
"Revisitation" of decisions regularly occurs in the current PPBS 
environment. Issues thought to have been decided in the programming
phase were often resurrected in the budgeting phase by OSD, 0MB, and the
45services. The vast and varied number of participants, excessive
pre-occupation with paperwork and details, a hectic pace, inconsistent 
categorizations, and the year-long demands of the process all added to 
the problem.
^^Ibid., p. 26.
**Ibid., p. 26.
*^Ibld., p. 26.
**Ibid., p. 26.
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4 6Neglect of execution was also evident. The emphasis— and the
reward— for years has been in the "front-end" justification of programs
and the obtaining of appropriations. In addition, the time of managers
at all levels in DOD is focused on shepherding their programs through the
various PPBS cycles. Program execution functions are generally
neglected and only limited feedback to policy makers/programmers to
improve subsequent cycles is built into the process.
There was a widespread perception that significant discontinuities
exist between PPBS and Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
47processes, the two major resource decision systems in DOD. Symptoms 
of problems can be seen in the continual conflicts surrounding and 
disrupting acquisition programs, the confusion over program costs, and 
the resulting program quantity adjustments.
Along with the problems and issues arrayed above, there were also 
lengthy discussions in the steering and working groups on role and 
membership of the DRB, and the role of (MB in the joint review.^®
Recommendat ions
After analyzing the problems and proposed solutions, the steering
49group reached consensus to endorse on a number of options:
A6 Ibid., p. 26. 
^^Ibid., p. 26.
^^Mallion, Moses and Smith, "Refocusing the PPBS," p. 16. 
49Puritano, "Streamlining PPBS," p. 27.
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* To improve strategic planning at the beginning of the PPBS cycle 
and improved long-range planning throughout the process.
* To improve policy and strategy interaction and definitive DOD 
policy statement by SECDEF, JCS, and the services.
* To greatly reduce directive program guidance.
* To develop a program document with reduced specifics.
* To reduce issue generation for the DRB in the sumner program 
review cycle.
* To reduce paperwork in the fall budget cycle (reduction of ZBB).
* To study data bases and proliferation of mission categories.
* To increase service membership on the DRB.
Revising PPBS
After review of the steering group recommendations by the Deputy 
Secretary, the Joint Chiefs, the Service Secretaries, the Under Secre­
taries and Assistant Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense announced his 
decisions for revising the entire DOD PPBS process.
The decisions, however, went much further than simply changing the 
PPBS. They established a broad set of management principles and
philosophy that set the base for major improvement in DOD over the next 
50few years.
These broad management principles included the management formula: 
centralized policy and decentralized operational responsibility to the 
Service Secretaries and to the services. This, in turn, means that
50Mallion, Moses and Smith, "Refocusing the PPBS," pp. 15-16.
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there has to be more precisely defined responsibility and accountability 
for results at the operating level.
The central OSD staffs have been asked to concentrate on a more 
appropriate central staff function by emphasizing broad central policy 
guidance rather than specific program direction as in previous years. 
Central analytical staffs are expected to emphasize cross-service and 
cross-command analysis to better help the Secretary make the high- 
priority decisions.
Managers at all levels in DOD are expected to look for economies 
and efficiencies and savings in carrying out their responsibilities.
OSD and the services were asked to join together in improving the 
PPBS process in a more participative mode. More teamwork and better 
communications are expected throughout the planning and budget year.
The Under Secretary of Policy was asked to work closely with JCS, 
the services, and other OSD staffs to provide within thirty days a 
proposal for a greatly improved strategic planning process.
The OSD program offices were asked to change the detailed 
directives of the past, to concentrate on broad policy guidance, to cut 
the paperwork required in the POM process by 50 percent, and to greatly 
reduce the number of issues raised to the DRB level for decision in the 
programming phase.
The DRB itself was restructured to include the Service Secretaries 
as full members. Further, the DRB will be used more frequently 
including, for the first time, in the planning phase to review and
C ^
^Puritano, "Streamlining PPBS," p. 27.
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approve the policy and strategy that will set the base finding levels 
for future program and budget decisions.
The budget phase was streamlined by reducing the mammoth paperwork 
requirements of the ZBB process. The concept of prioritizing programs 
at the margin will be kept but, with the concurrence of 0KB acquired 
through an exchange of letters between the Secretary and the Director of 
0KB, the ZBB reporting requirements will be greatly reduced beginning 
this year with the FT 83-87 submission.
Another major decision with long-term implications is that the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the DRB, will be 
responsible for total management of the new PPBS. The Executive 
Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense will serve as the Executive 
Secretary to the DRB to assist the Deputy Secretary manage the year-long 
PPBS cycle in all its aspects and to guide the implementation of the 
PPBS improvements.
The Under Secretary for Policy was directed to formulate a new 
strategic planning process, together with the JCS, the services and 
other OSD staffs, to build a better foundation for the remainder of the 
PPB process.
Finally, the Deputy Secretary announced, in his March 27, 198! 
implementation memorandum, that the new process was to start immediately 
with the preparation of the FT 1983-87 budget submission. The 
transition to the new PPBS was to take a full year particularly for the
^^Ibid., p. 28.
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new strategic planning process to "take hold," but as many actions as
53possible were to begin immediately with the FY 1982 budget cycle.
53Weinberger, "SECDEF Weinberger’s Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System Brings Practical Management to the Defense Program," 
p. 14.
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CHAPTE3 V 
WHERE DC WE STAND?
President Reagan's support for a strong defense was clearly 
reflected in the 1981 and 1982 budget proposals. The President is also 
resolved to make ^cveixment more efficient and effective and has given 
this commitment a major priority in his administration.
The ability to execute the vital missions of the Department of 
Defense must be the major consideration in any discussion of Defense 
program management. The Department's basic responsibility is to main­
tain modem, effective and balanced military forces that are able to 
deter, or defeat any attacks on the United States and its vital 
interests, which include the security of our friends and allies.
The second priority is to accomplish these basic missions as 
efficiently as possible. The ability of the Department of Defense to 
take advantage of improvements in operations will be enhanced by 
revisions to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. Review of 
the PP3S was designed to improve the interface between Defense policies 
and national military strategy, on the one hand, and our military 
capabilities, on the other; and to streamline the DOD decision-making 
process.
The revised PPBS process has begun. The consolidated guidance of 
the past has been replaced by the Secretary's Defense Guidance (DC).
The FY 1983-1987 DG has been implemented by the services.
54Zero based budgeting (ZBB) has been disbanded. The Comptroller
^^Kallion, Moses and Smith, "Refocusing the PPBS," p. 16.
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is working closely with the 0MB as well as leading a study group to 
reduce the data demands and further rationalize the information used 
throughout the PBB process. However, the Secretary does acknowledge the 
benefits from re-examining the necessity and desirability of continuing 
programs.
The Department of Defense is pursuing the goal of improving DOD 
management with a strong sense of purpose. Their program appears likely 
to succeed for several reasons. First, Increased attention to 
long-range planning will lead to more rational decisions and more 
stability in their programs. Rational, stable programs are easier to 
support and implement. Second, their insistence on broad participation 
in the review and decision making process will gain and maintain the 
involvement of managers at all levels. Finally, their principle of 
decentralized responsibility, authority, and accountability will 
intensify the focus on program execution. In the final analysis, better 
program execution holds the key to the success I am predicting. The 
efficient execution of plans and programs is where the Defense 
Department will be judged by the public. Officials at all levels must 
understand completely the roles they play in this process.
In summary, a sound program for management improvement has been 
designed. In spite of the short period of time to study the problem, 
the streamlining and Improvement of the PPBS process is moving rapidly 
toward the goal of significantly improving the management of defense 
resources.
Improved "front end" planning will exert a stronger influence on
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program decisions and create more accurate budgets. These budgets 
should be less susceptible to modification as they will be more closely 
related to defense strategy requirements and Congressional intent 
through the improved planning and programming process. There will still 
be lively debates about alternatives among military department staffs, 
OSD staffs, and Congressional leaders throughout the PPBS cycle.
However, that is what PPBS is all about.
Although we are not there yet, the Defense Secretary's new 
management philosophy and PPBS review decisions are important events 
which should make this program a success.
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CHAPTER V:
CONCLUSION
The budgetary process is critical in any organization because, to a 
great extent, "collars are policy." If the funds for a particular 
activity cannot be acquired, planning becomes fruitless and execution 
impossible. In the Department of Defense the budgetary process is 
especially Important. DOD has a very thin legislative base. Almost all 
of its programs must be acted or. annually by the Executive and 
Legislative Branches in the budget process. Unlike other federal 
agencies, the DOD receives no long-term commitments from Congress.
Additionally, approximately 70% of the controllable expenditures in 
the entire federal government are in the area of national defense. 
Therefore, defense appropriations are the easiest to manipulate in order 
to implement a particular fiscal policy.
The DOD PPBS is the key management mechanism by which the Secretary 
can exercise his statutory control over, and make trade-offs among, the 
capabilities of the military departments and the defense agencies.
Thus, it is not at all surprising that Secretaries of Defense have spent 
a great deal of time and effort on the format as well as substance of 
the defense budgeting process. The format determines not only who will 
make the decisions, but also how they will be made, and therefore, to a 
large degree, what decisions will be made.
The basic features of the McNamara PPB system are still in effect. 
The planning-programming-budgeting system is firmly established, 
although subject to procedural changes. Analytical cools and techniques 
continue to be applied but they are no longer the principal determinants 
in the decision process.
44
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Congress still exercises the dominant influence on the Department 
of Defense budget, and the size and complexity of the budget adds to the 
difficulty of Congressional review. The need to improve the ability of 
Congress to deal with the DOD budget has led to various suggestions, 
none of which has gained much support.
The success of the Weinberger-Carlucci approach will ultimately be 
judged on the quality of the budgetary decisions that are made. A 
streamlined process will not, of itself, produce those enlightened 
decisions. However, their approach has provided a framework which 
capitalizes on over three decades of DOD experience and at the same time 
eliminates unnecessary paperwork. The quality of these decisions now 
depends upon how well the leadership of DOD uses the process to develop 
defense programs that conform to the realities of the international 
environment rather than vested parochial interests.
There is still considerable room for improvement in the manner in 
which DOD carries out this vital function. Whatever the future changes, 
the last thirty years has demonstrated that there are two primary 
constraints on the process which will be operative no matter what form 
the defense budgetary structure takes.
The budgetary process will be inherently political. The ceilings 
on the budget will always be affected by the political situation of the 
President. There never will be any formula or technique to determine 
the exact size of the defense appropriation. The final figure will be 
decided by the desires of the President; i.e., does he desire to have a 
balanced budget like Eisenhower or does he want to stimulate the economy 
like Kennedy.
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Similarly, the disposition of funds within the defense budget will 
always reflect the desires of the subunits of DOD to maintain their 
organizations. Regardless of the amount of analysis, it will remain 
difficult to dissuade the A m y  from trying to increase the number of 
combat divisions and the Air Force its manned bombers.
Also, planning will remain irrelevant for the budget process. 
Political leaders cannot be expected to provide definitive guidance to 
military planners about how they will act in specific contingencies, 
because they, themselves are not sure what they will do. They prefer to 
preserve their flexibility. Without this definitive guidance, military 
leaders cannot be expected to develop plans that are very relevant for 
the budgetary process.
An evaluation of progress made in handling defense requirements 
during the past two years would point to the contributions of the 
improved PPB system. Increased emphasis has been given to effective and 
efficient management. The security of this nation demands the best 
possible array of forces, but it is also important that these forces be 
provided in the most efficient and cost-effective manner.
Procedures and techniques are not substitutes for wisdom and 
judgment. They are, however, aids to the effective exercise of these 
faculties. Their use will assist the Nation to govern Itself more 
effectively and to achieve its national objectives more efficiently. In 
the words of the late President Johnson, "The people will be the 
beneficiary."
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